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Abstract
The purpose of the UDROP proposal is to prevent debt rollover crises for foreign-currency-
enominated debt instruments.  For such liabilities, there is no international analogue to the
domestic lender of last resort or to domestic deposit insurance.  UDROP stands for Universal Debt
Rollover Option with a Penalty.  Our proposal is that all foreign currency liabilities should have
a rollover option attached to them.  The ‘pure’ version of the option would entitle the borrower
to extend or roll over his performing debt at maturity for a specified period.  The pricing of the
option would be left to the contracting parties.  A number of variants on the basic version are also
considered.  These make the individual borrower’s ability to exercise his option contingent on the
prior declaration of a state of ‘disorderly markets’, by the national central bank, the International
Monetary Fund or an  indicator of ‘disorderly markets’.  All versions of the scheme have the
property that no commitment of public money is required, either by national governments or by
international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
The UDROP proposal is rule based and general: it is mandatory for all foreign-currency
debt and automatic.  That is, it is exercised at the discretion of the borrower. This stands in sharp
contrast to the current practice of discretionary and politicised refinancing arrangements cobbled
together in an ad-hoc manner on a case-by-case basis by the International Monetary Fund. UDROP
is market-oriented: the terms and conditions on any foreign-currency loan and associated rollover
option would be negotiated by the lenders and borrowers.
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Non-Technical Summary
Sometimes a solvent borrower with illiquid assets and short-term liabilities faces a liquidity
crisis.  Consider a bank whose liabilities are convertible on demand into cash and whose assets
consist of old-fashioned, non-securitised loans.  These loans are all as safe as Fort Knox or the
Bank of England, but they have long remaining maturities.  As long as most depositors believe that
there will not be a run on the bank, there is no reason for any depositor to cash in his deposit and
the bank is safe.  If, however, a belief arises that enough depositors may withdraw their deposits
at short notice, each depositor has an incentive to convert his deposit into cash.  In a first-come,
first-served environment, where cashable claims exceed the cash in the till, a bank run is the only
individually rational response.  The bank will fail.  This is one reason we have, at the national
level, a lender of last resort, deposit insurance, unscheduled bank holidays and other devices
aimed at preventing a bank run.
A country with a fixed exchange rate can face the same problem as a bank if its financial
sector has a large short-term foreign-currency debt that is not hedged with comparable short-term
foreign-currency assets.  Imagine an emerging market commercial bank that has borrowed hard
currency abroad and made domestic-currency loans.  This foreign-currency borrower is solvent
and if the short-term debt can be rolled over, it will be serviced in full.  But, if its foreign creditors
are seized by one of the occasional waves of panic that affect even the doughtiest financiers, the
debt rollover will not take place or only on terms little related to the underlying creditworthiness
of the borrower.  Faced with an urgent need for foreign exchange to repay the maturing short-term
debt, the borrower will turn to the central bank.  If the value of the maturing debt exceeds the
available foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, a foreign exchange crisis results.  The
local currency plunges, creating an imbalance between foreign-currency liabilities and domestic-
currency assets that can wipe out domestic banks’ capital.  Bank failures may occur and if the
government is among the borrowers, it too can default.  The crisis spreads to the country’s
commercial and industrial borrowers.  Foreign lenders must write off their loans. If the scale of
the problem is large enough, a global financial crisis can ensue.
A foreign-currency version of deposit insurance is not feasible.  Domestic deposit
insurance is ultimately underwritten by the central bank and the treasury and relies on the central
bank’s ability to produce the necessary cash to pay off footloose depositors.  The deposit insurer,
like any lender of last resort, must have deep pockets.  Faced with a foreign exchange crisis, a
national central bank does not have and cannot borrow the required foreign exchange.  Only
external entities with full coffers can hope to stop a bank run.
We propose a universal debt rollover option with a penalty (UDROP) to deal with
liquidity crises.  All foreign-currency liabilities must have a rollover option attached to it.  This
includes private and sovereign, long-term and short-term, marketable and non-marketable debt,
including overdrafts, credit lines and other contingent claims.  This would entitle the borrower,
at his sole discretion, to extend maturing debt for a specified period (say three or six months) at
a penalty rate.  The borrower would be entitled to the rollover only if the debt in question had
been serviced in full, barring the final repayment.  The UDROP would permit no further extensions
after the initial rollover.  For the scheme to work, the penalty must be large enough to ensure that
the borrower would not exercise the rollover option under orderly market conditions.  It might be
specified as a hefty surcharge on top of the spread over the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate
(LIBOR) that the borrower would normally pay for the currency in question. This ‘normal’ spread
might be computed as a long-run moving average of the actual market spreads.
We expect the penalty spread and other features of the rollover contract, to be negotiated
between debtors and creditors, rather than decreed by a government or international body.  While
borrowers would be obliged to acquire and retain a rollover option for the full face value of the
debt, the pricing of these options is up to market participants.  One possible pricing structure might
be an up front commitment fee plus a rule for determining the ‘penalty spread’ over the ‘normal
spread’ on the loan extension if the rollover option is exercised.
The ambitions behind this proposal are modest.  Default is costly.   Unnecessary defaults
should be avoided.  Disorderly markets can cause foreign currency debt rollover crises that result
in unnecessary defaults.  Disorderly market conditions are unusual and short-lived.  The rollover
option allows foreign currency debtors to ride out the storm until orderly market conditions prevail
again and new debt can be issued.  It will only be useful when otherwise solvent borrowers are
unable to roll over their foreign-currency debt because of a liquidity crisis.  It is meant solely to
minimise the consequences of disorderly markets.  This scheme is ineffective if a debtor (country)
is insolvent.  In the case of Russia, for example, the government’s chronic inability to raise tax
revenues commensurate with its spending ambitions, makes our option scheme irrelevant.  A
country that is able, but unwilling, to service its maturing debt would likewise not be reformed by
this scheme.  It would roll over its debt at the penalty rate and default at the end of the rollover
period.  Our proposal only helps when a country is solvent and willing to pay, but is prevented
from doing so because international financial and credit markets have a temporary seizure.  Korea
would have benefited from this scheme.  Brazil would be less stressed if its maturing debt had a
rollover option attached to it.
The UDROP proposal is only meant to address disorderly market conditions.  Large
sudden capital inflows or outflows can, even under orderly market conditions, create serious
dislocations in the real economy.  It does not help countries cope more effectively with overvalued
exchange rates and overheating economies, nor does it address the ultimate causes of these
common problems.
There are many grander proposals for improving the international financial system.  These
include proposals for restraining capital flows, either with ‘Tobin taxes’ or ‘Chilean-style’
administrative controls and descriptions of mechanisms to facilitate an ‘orderly workout’ of
sovereign debt defaults.  Our scheme is compatible with these proposals, but its effectiveness does
not depend on their success.
Under the ‘pure’ version of the scheme, no third party determines whether the conditions
for exercising the option have been satisfied.  No central bank or national supervisory or
regulatory agency nor the International Monetary Fund or any other international financial
institution is called upon to judge whether economic and market conditions warrant the exercising
of the option.   The exercise of the option is at the sole discretion of the borrower.  This is
attractive because a ‘liquidity crisis’ is not always verifiable.
 We also consider variations on the UDROP proposal where the option cannot be exercised
without the prior declaration of a state of disorderly markets by either the relevant central bank,
the International Monetary Fund, or a mechanical “disorderly markets trigger”.  These versions
of the scheme retain the attractive property that no commitment of public money is required, either
by national governments or by international agencies.
UDROP
A Small Contribution to the
New International Financial Architecture
Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert
I. Liquidity Crises: The Problem
Sometimes a solvent borrower with illiquid assets and short-term liabilities faces a liquidity
crisis.1  Consider a bank whose liabilities are convertible on demand into cash and whose assets
consist of old-fashioned, non-securitised loans.  These loans are all as safe as Fort Knox or the
Bank of England, but they have long remaining maturities.  As long as most depositors believe that
there will not be a run on the bank, there is no reason for any depositor to cash in his deposit and
the bank is safe.  If, however, a belief arises that enough depositors may withdraw their deposits
at short notice, each depositor has an incentive to convert his deposit into cash.  In a first-come,
first-served environment, where cashable claims exceed the cash in the till, a bank run is the only
individually rational response.  The bank will fail.  This is one reason we have, at the national
level, a lender of last resort, deposit insurance, unscheduled bank holidays and other devices
aimed at preventing a bank run.
A country with a fixed exchange rate can face the same problem as a bank if its financial
sector has a large short-term foreign-currency debt that is not hedged with comparable short-term
foreign-currency assets.2  Imagine an emerging market commercial bank that has borrowed hard
currency abroad and made domestic-currency loans.  This foreign-currency borrower is solvent
and if the short-term debt can be rolled over, it will be serviced in full.  But, if its foreign creditors
are seized by one of the occasional waves of panic that affect even the doughtiest financiers, the
debt rollover will not take place or only on terms little related to the underlying creditworthiness
of the borrower.  Faced with an urgent need for foreign exchange to repay the maturing short-term
debt, the borrower will turn to the central bank.  If the value of the maturing debt exceeds the
available foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, a foreign exchange crisis results.3  The
local currency plunges, creating an imbalance between foreign-currency liabilities and domestic-
currency assets that can wipe out domestic banks’ capital.  Bank failures may occur and if the
government is among the borrowers, it too can default.  The crisis spreads to the country’s
commercial and industrial borrowers.  Foreign lenders must write off their loans. If the scale of
the problem is large enough, a global financial crisis can ensue.
                                                
1 The classic paper on bank runs is Diamond and Dybvig [1983].  See also Diamond [1984] and Dybvig [1992].  For
international models of self-fulfilling debt crises see Cole and Kehoe [1996] and Krugman [1997].
2 For recent reminders see International Monetary Fund [1998], especially Section II, “The Crisis in Emerging Markets” and
Section III, “Turbulence in Mature Financial Markets” and Goldstein [1998].  Interesting theoretical models of international
contagion and crisis  include Caballero and Krishnamurthy [1998], Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini [1998a], Chang and Velasco
[1998a,b], Chan-Lau and Chen [1998], Huang and Xu [1998], Loisel and Martin [1999].  Empirical studies of the most recent
crises include Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes [1995], Sachs, Tornell and Velasco [1996], Glick and Rose [1998], Kaminsky
and Reinhart [1998], Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini [1998b] and Eichengreen and Rose [1998].  The role of liquidity is
highlighted in Goldfajn and Valdes [1997] and in Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache [1997].
3 Including access to borrowed foreign exchange reserves.
2Of course foreign exchange crises can occur without foreign-currency-denominated
external loans.  Suppose a country has a fixed exchange rate and domestic banks have only home-
currency liabilities.  If international capital flows are unrestricted, domestic residents can decide
to swap their liquid domestic financial assets into foreign exchange. The central bank is stripped
of its foreign exchange reserves and must devalue its currency or let it float.  However, there are
two differences between this and the previous scenario.  First, there is no default on external debt
and, second, there is no mismatch between foreign-currency liabilities and domestic-currency
assets in resident banks’ balance sheets.  This precludes the defaults and bankruptcies otherwise
associated with a currency collapse.
Under a floating exchange rate regime, future exchange rates are always uncertain. Sensible
and risk averse foreign-currency borrowers take precautions to lower the chances of finding
themselves with too large a net short foreign exchange position.  However, any open position can
turn against a market participant.  If the exposure is sufficiently large, this can result in bankruptcy.
 Supervision and regulation should ensure that the private and social costs and returns to foreign-
currency investments are closely matched.
Although banking crises can occur with floating exchange rates, fixed exchange rate
regimes may foster a moral hazard problem.  In Asia, those who acquired short-term foreign
exchange loans assumed that the central bank would underwrite the exchange risk by maintaining
the pegged exchange rate.
In principle, central banks can always fight off a speculative attack.  All they must do is
set overnight and other short-term interest rates high enough to achieve the necessary contraction
of domestic credit.  The requisite rates depend on the perceived commitment of the central bank,
and without credibility they may be very high indeed.  For example, a confidently expected ten per
cent devaluation of the currency overnight, requires a ten per cent overnight interest rate
differential (at a daily rate) to discourage speculators.  The corresponding annualised rate causes
an overflow on most small hand calculators.  During the ERM crisis of 1992-1993, the central
banks of Sweden and Ireland were unable to stave off devaluation even though they set the rates
charged by their central banks on overnight reserves at 500 and 300 per cent, respectively.4
The political unpopularity of very high rates, and the real economic damage they do to
borrowers affected by it, make a policy of defending a fixed exchange rate by interest rate
increases ‘à l’outrance’ less than fully credible.  While there exists an equilibrium where a
credible peg is defended successfully with relatively low interest rates, the more likely outcome
is an unsuccessful attempt to defend an incredible peg with very high rates.  A few currency pegs,
such as the currency boards of Argentina and Hong Kong, have survived.  But, for most countries,
a currency peg remains a high-risk strategy.
Following the demise of the gold standard after World War I, righteous academics and
self-interested lobbyists recognised the domestic stabilisation role of monetary policy.  The notion
that monetary policy could be devoted solely to the defence of an exchange rate peg became
incredible.  During the Bretton Woods era, capital controls were widespread and the vulnerability
of currency pegs could be hidden or suppressed for a while.  With the nearly unfettered financial
capital mobility of today, currency pegs die much more swiftly and spectacularly.
A foreign-currency version of deposit insurance is not feasible.  Domestic deposit
insurance is ultimately underwritten by the central bank and the treasury and relies on the central
bank’s ability to produce the necessary cash to pay off footloose depositors.  The deposit insurer,
like any lender of last resort, must have deep pockets.  Faced with a foreign exchange crisis, a
national central bank does not have and cannot borrow the required foreign exchange.  Only
external entities with full coffers can hope to stop a bank run.
                                                
4 See Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1998a,b].
3To a small extent, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), other international financial
institutions, and the creditor-country governments, have tried to be an international lender of last
resort.  They do this either with their own money or by pressuring private financial institutions into
involuntary rollovers and other forms of involuntary credit extension.5  In the 14 months since the
Asian crisis arose, three things have become apparent: first, the G-10s’ and multilaterals’ pockets
are not deep enough; second, their ability or willingness to cajole unwilling creditors into
involuntary rollovers is too limited; and third, the adverse selection and moral hazard problems
inherent in any conceivable global deposit insurance or lender-of-last-resort arrangement are too
severe. Conventional IMF lending, with conditionality and money available only in tranches is
inappropriate for dealing with a liquidity crisis.
II. UDROP:  A Proposal
We propose a universal debt rollover option with a penalty (UDROP) to deal with liquidity
crises.  All foreign-currency IOUs must have a rollover option attached to it.  This includes private
and sovereign, long-term and short-term, marketable and non-marketable debt, including
overdrafts, credit lines and contingent claims.6  In the case of contingent claims, the rollover
should be for the value of the liability realised when the contingencies that define the claim
materialise.  For sake of brevity, we will refer to all foreign currency obligations as ‘loans’.  This
option would entitle the borrower, at his sole discretion, to extend maturing debt for a specified
period (say three or six months) at a penalty rate.7  The borrower would be entitled to the
rollover only if the debt in question had been serviced in full, barring the final repayment.  The
UDROP would permit no further extensions after the initial rollover.  For the scheme to work, the
penalty must be large enough to ensure that the borrower would not exercise the rollover option
under orderly market conditions.  It might be specified as a hefty surcharge on top of the spread
over LIBOR that the borrower would normally pay for the currency in question.  This ‘normal’
spread might be computed  as a long-run moving average of the actual market spreads.  We
expect the penalty spread and other features of the rollover contract, to be negotiated between
debtors and creditors, rather than decreed by a government or international body.  While
borrowers would be obliged to acquire and retain a rollover option for the full face value of the
debt, the pricing of these options is up to market participants.  One possible pricing structure might
be an upfront commitment fee plus a rule for determining the ‘penalty spread’ over the ‘normal
spread’ on the loan extension if the rollover option is exercised.8
The ambitions behind this proposal are modest.  Default is costly.   Unnecessary defaults
should be avoided.  Disorderly markets can cause foreign currency debt rollover crises that result
in unnecessary defaults.  Disorderly market conditions are unusual and short-lived.  The rollover
option allows foreign currency debtors to ride out the storm until orderly market conditions prevail
                                                
5 The truth is not served by the Orwellian practice of calling loans “voluntary” when they are rolled over after arm-twisting by
multilateral agencies and G-10 governments.
6 It is important that the option be for both short- and long-term foreign currency debt, because over time, long maturities have
a habit of becoming short maturities. Only if all debt took the form of perpetuities (liabilities with infinite maturities) would rollover
crises not occur.  Most private financial instruments have finite maturities. Equity is an obvious exception.  Very few governments
have issued perpetuities.  British government consols are a notable exception.
7 Richard Brealey has pointed out to us that, as an implication of put-call parity, the short loan cum rollover option is equivalent
to a longer loan with a pre-payment option.  If the rollover is priced at a penalty rate, the prepayment would be priced at a
discounted rate.
8 This “rule” could of course be as simple as a fixed number.
4again and new debt can be issued.  It will only be useful when otherwise solvent borrowers are
unable to roll over their foreign-currency debt because of a liquidity crisis.  It is meant solely to
minimise the consequences of disorderly markets.  This scheme is ineffective if a debtor (country)
is insolvent.9  In the case of Russia, for example, the government’s chronic inability to raise tax
revenues commensurate with its spending ambitions, makes our option scheme irrelevant.  A
country that is able, but unwilling, to service its maturing debt would likewise not be reformed by
this scheme.  It would roll over its debt at the penalty rate and default at the end of the rollover
period.  Our proposal only helps when a country is solvent and willing to pay, but is prevented
from doing so because international financial and credit markets have a temporary seizure.  Korea
would have benefited from this scheme.  Brazil would be less stressed if its maturing debt had a
rollover option attached to it.
The UDROP proposal is only meant to address disorderly market conditions.  Large
sudden capital inflows or outflows can, even under orderly market conditions, create serious
dislocations in the real economy.  It does not help countries cope more effectively with overvalued
exchange rates and overheating economies, nor does it address the ultimate causes of these
common problems.
There are many grander proposals for improving the international financial system. These
include proposals for restraining capital flows, either with ‘Tobin taxes’ or ‘Chilean-style’
administrative controls and descriptions of mechanisms to facilitate an ‘orderly workout’ of
sovereign debt defaults.10  Our scheme is compatible with these proposals, but its effectiveness
does not depend on their success.
Under the ‘pure’ version of the scheme, no third party determines whether the conditions
for exercising the option have been satisfied.  No central bank or national supervisory or
regulatory agency nor the IMF or any other international financial institution is called upon to judge
whether economic and market conditions warrant the exercising of the option.   The exercise of
the option is at the sole discretion of the borrower. This is attractive because a ‘liquidity crisis’
is not always verifiable. 
In Section III.1 we consider variations on the UDROP proposal where the option cannot
be exercised without the prior declaration of a state of disorderly markets by either the relevant
central bank, the IMF, or a mechanical “disorderly markets trigger”.  These versions of the scheme
retain the attractive property that no commitment of public money is required, either by national
governments or by international agencies.
III. UDROP Close Up
In this Section we consider some of the characteristics of the UDROP proposal of Section II in
greater detail.
III.1  Why does the rollover option apply only to foreign-currency liabilities?
                                                
9 It is a drawback of the proposal that insolvent borrowers can postpone formal default by exercising the rollover option.  See
Sections III.1 and III.2.
10 See Dornbusch [1998] and Fischer et al [1998] for a discussion of the former type of plan and Eichengreen and Portes
[1995], Sachs [1995, 1996], Kenen [1996], Eichengreen [1998] and Litan [1998] for descriptions of the latter.  Eaton [1987,
1989] analyses the welfare costs of capital flight in a second-best world. 
5There is no lender of last resort for domestic borrowers with foreign-currency liabilities.  Our
proposal is aimed at filling this gap.  For domestic-currency-denominated liabilities, the national
central bank is a domestic lender of last resort.  It can always print any amount of domestic
currency to accommodate a sudden surge in demand.  In the absence of an international lender of
last resort with an unlimited capacity for creating foreign currency, the same does not apply to
foreign-currency-denominated liabilities.11
Applying UDROP only to foreign-currency liabilities creates an additional asymmetry
between debtors who differ in the currency in which their debt is denominated.12  Imagine, for
example, a bank which has made two loans to domestic residents, one denominated in the domestic
currency and one denominated in a foreign currency.  If either borrower defaults, the creditor can
appeal to the domestic courts and may be able to attach some of the debtor’s assets. However, the
invocation of default procedures following nonpayment of the loan is immediate in the case of the
domestic-currency borrower.  In the case of the foreign-currency borrower with UDROP attached,
the default procedures are postponed for the duration of the period for which UDROP permits the
debt to be rolled over.  This need not create a problem, however.  Market pricing of the UDROP
option will ensure that lenders are indifferent between the two types of loans.
UDROP is not without drawbacks as it may worsen adverse-selection problems in credit
markets.  An adverse-selection problem may occur when lenders are unable to distinguish between
borrowers with different characteristics.  For example, some borrowers may be more likely to
become insolvent in orderly markets than others and this may not be observable to lenders.  If the
invocation of the UDROP proposal is at the discretion of borrowers then it can be invoked by
insolvent borrowers in orderly markets as well as by fundamentally sound borrowers in disorderly
markets.  This makes foreign-currency loans with UDROP more attractive to the relatively risky
borrowers.  If the lenders try to charge a risk premium in the form of a higher penalty rate, then
UDROP would become less attractive to the safer borrowers and more attractive to the risky ones.
 There may be no penalty rate at which lenders want to satisfy foreign-currency loan demand. 
Adverse selection typically leads to inefficiency.13
In Section III.3 we consider mechanisms for minimising the risk of abuse of the option.
Even when the exercise of the option is at the sole discretion of the borrower, we believe that the
potential for abuse, while real, is unlikely to outweigh the benefits of the proposal.  There are two
reasons for this.
First, the initiation of legal default proceedings against defaulters on foreign-currency
liabilities is postponed for the duration of the rollover (we expect this to be between three and six
months), rather than avoided permanently.  Second, the lender and the borrower are free to
negotiate any terms and conditions for the rollover package.  In countries with reasonable debtor-
creditor laws, the adverse selection problem may be mitigated with collateral requirements.
Lenders can offer both UDROP contracts with high penalty rates and low collateral and UDROP
contracts with lower penalty rates and high collateral.  Then borrowers will sort themselves by
type.  Those who are likely to become insolvent in orderly markets prefer the former contract;
those who are unlikely to be insolvent except in disorderly markets prefer the latter.
                                                
11 There is of course nothing to stop lenders and borrowers in domestic currency from creating their own, voluntary debt rollover
options (VDROP). 
12 This was pointed out by Bert van Selm during the March 5, 1999 seminar at the Nederlandsche Bank where the UDROP
proposal was discussed.
13 UDROP may also cause moral-hazard problems.  Once the option is invoked, borrowers may have an incentive to engage
in riskier behaviour than they otherwise would.  However, this does not obviously lead to inefficiency. See Besley [1994] and
Aizenman [1998] for discussions of adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems in loan markets.
6III.2  Should the option be for one or for multiple rollovers?
Our proposal is for a mandatory option for one fixed-term rollover only.  One could, in principle,
envisage a UDROP for a sequence of rollovers, each one at a higher penalty rate than the previous
one.  There are several reasons for not going this route.  First, in the limit it would permit an
insolvent borrower (or a borrower who is unwilling to meet the terms of the original debt
contract), to engage in what effectively would be Ponzi finance, without the creditor being able
to invoke the sanctions of formal default and bankruptcy.14  Second, rollover crises tend to be
intense but short-lived.  A three or six month extension to the original loan should enable the dust
to settle.
III.3  Should a party other than the borrower pull the trigger?
In its pure form our proposal envisages calls for the rollover option to be exercised at the sole
discretion of the borrower.15  Wim Boonstra has argued that a possible solution to adverse-
selection problems associated with UDROP is to alter the way the option is triggered.16  The idea
is to find a mechanism so that UDROP is exercised only in ‘disorderly market conditions’ rather
than in ‘normal’ times. 
Boonstra’s first proposal involves giving national central banks the power to decide when
a liquidity crisis has occurred.  The UDROPs can be exercised only after a crunch has been
officially declared.  We do not believe the central bank should rule on individual cases.  The
pressure on the central bank to act hastily would preclude the bank from being able to gather
sufficient information to do so.  It would also create a serious threat of corruption and would
encourage wasteful rent-seeking by interested parties. 
Even if the central bank remained virtuous and disinterested, its competence in this area
can be questioned.  In many countries, the central bank is close to being a pure ‘monetary authority’
with very limited supervisory and regulatory functions.   Even when it has significant supervisory
and regulatory functions, it is unlikely to have the information necessary to make the ‘illiquid’
versus ‘insolvent’ call with any degree of accuracy.  There is also no reason to believe that the
most exposed foreign-currency debtors will be central-bank-regulated financial intermediaries.
 Indeed they may not be classified as financial intermediaries at all. 
The allure of the UDROP proposal is that it does not require any intrusive vetting of
would-be rollover candidates by some third party.  Restricting the role of the central banks to that
of determining a state of national disorderly markets might not compromise the strengths of
UDROP too much.  Granting the national central banks the power to authorise the exercise of
UDROPs by all borrowers in their jurisdiction would be a natural extension of the lender of last
resort function of the central bank.  Note, however, that among the foreign currency debtors who
might wish to invoke the rollover option could be a national government or indeed a central bank
itself.  The potential for abuse of UDROP by the insolvent would therefore not be completely
eliminated.
In another version of UDROP, the power to make a determination of disorderly markets
(either at the national level or at a wider regional or global level) would rest with the IMF rather
                                                
14 Consider a sequence of one-period maturity loans.  In a Ponzi scheme, the borrower each period borrows an amount at least
equal to last period’s principal plus interest due.
15 The “European” option format, according to which an option can be exercised only at a specific date (in our case the expiration
date of the original loan contract) seems slightly simpler than the “American” option format, under which the option can be
exercised any time before or at a specific date, but no issue of principle is involved.
16 At the March 5, 1999 seminar at the Nederlandsche Bank and in subsequent correspondence.
7than with central banks.  However, one of the strengths of the pure UDROP proposal is that it
keeps politically mandated international bureaucrats out of the debt rollover game.  Our proposal
is rule-based, market-oriented and general.  This is at the opposite end of the spectrum from IMF
operations, which tend to be discretionary, intensely political and case-by-case.  Inevitably, a
decision on whether to declare a condition of national disorderly market would be tied up with
how happy the IMF felt with a country’s general compliance with IMF standards of good
behaviour.  The experience of the last two decades raises doubts about whether the Fund possesses
the expertise, the clout or the political independence to be an effective arbiter.17  The only role for
the IMF that would preserve the key strengths of UDROP would be for the Fund to be granted the
authority to authorise the exercise of UDROPs globally, by declaring a state of ‘global disorderly
markets’.
A final restriction on the pure debtor-initiated trigger mechanism, also proposed by
Boonstra, would be to base the determination of a condition of national disorderly markets on a
mechanical rule, based on observable and ‘objective’ indicators, rather than on the judgement of
a central bank or a multilateral agency.  One definition of ‘disorderly markets’ might be a rapid
and large increase in the spread on sovereign debt over the relevant benchmark.  Another might
be a sufficiently sudden and sizable loss of net foreign exchange reserves.  It is essential for this
alternative, that the relevant variables are well defined, that they can be measured swiftly and that
their values are verifiable.  Speed, automaticity, universality and absence of political interference
must remain the hallmarks of the UDROP.
III.4  Should the rollover option be mandatory or voluntary?
The reason for making the rollover option mandatory is that rollover risk is not correctly priced
in international financial markets.  An important reason for this is adverse selection.
Some might object that creditworthy borrowers, unlikely to face a rollover problem,
should not be forced to pay for this irrelevant option.  In our view, there is a crucial weakness in
relying solely on market forces to produce voluntary rollover schemes (VDROPS) or analogous
arrangements such as those discussed below. 
If borrowers differ in the likelihood that they would invoke the option in times of orderly
markets, then safer borrowers might try to signal their type by asking for loans without the rollover
option.  Refusing the option would become necessary to be judged credit worthy.  This could limit
or destroy the effectiveness of any voluntary, market-based scheme. This may be the key reason
why the markets have not produced any significant amount of VDROPs. The negative consequences
of adverse selection can be mitigated by mandating.  This is well known from other areas of
insurance where adverse selection is a problem, such as health insurance.  UDROP falls squarely
in that tradition.
There have already been some plans similar to what we propose.  Argentina and Mexico
have schemes where the country pays a commitment fee to foreign banks in return for the right to
draw upon a foreign-currency facility over a specified time period.  This is similar to a foreign-
currency overdraft facility or credit line and  is a (voluntary) option to borrow foreign currency.18
                                                
17 For a more positive view of the IMF’s role and performance, see Fischer [1998]. Brealey [1999] contains a wide-ranging
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of IMF operations.
18 From Eichengreen [1998], we quote the following information on these credit lines.  Argentina agreed a contingent repurchase
facility with 13 commercial banks, which provides for $7 billion in standby credits.  Mexico has an arrangement with 31
commercial banks which provides for $2.5 billion in facilities.  The Argentine Central Bank can swap Argentine Government
securities for US dollars up to the specified ceiling, at an effective interest rate of LIBOR plus 205 basis points.  The commitment
fee is 33 basis points.  Loan length is two to five years, depending on the commercial bank involved.  These agreements omit
the no-adverse-material-change clause that would otherwise permit banks to back out of their agreement in the event of a crisis.
8The Argentine central bank and a group of 14 international banks agreed upon a Contingent Repo
Program.  This gives the central bank the option to sell certain domestic assets for US dollars
subject to a repurchase clause.  In 1995, Mexico arranged a contingent-loan facility with a group
of international banks.  Indonesia arranged stand-by facilities three times during the period 1995-
1997 and made drawings totaling $1.5 billion on two occasions.
In a similar spirit, in May 1998 the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee proposed that
a haircut be imposed on foreign-currency creditors who refuse to roll over their loans to countries
who have been granted IMF emergency lending.19  IMF emergency lending should be made
conditional on borrowing countries having a mechanism that imposes a financial penalty (the
haircut) on creditors who refuse to roll over their credit.  The haircut does not apply if the
creditors roll over their loans at no higher rate of interest until the IMF loan is paid back.  We
view this proposal as inadequate for dealing with liquidity crises that often erupt with very little
notice.  If one had to wait until an IMF loan (presumably with an IMF program and associated
conditionality attached) was agreed, the damage would already be done.  The rollover mechanism
has to be automatic.  It should be activated at the discretion of the borrower, without any need for
time-consuming interventions and assessments by international agencies or national central banks.
 The pure UDROP proposal satisfies these criteria.  The UDROP with central bank determination
of national disorderly market conditions comes close.
The main problem with these voluntary rollover facilities or credit lines is that they are
few and far between.  Where they have been arranged, they have covered only a small fraction of
the foreign-currency debt potentially subject to rollover problems.  No doubt the adverse selection
problem already referred to is one cause for the market’s under-provision of rollover insurance.
It is easy to overstate the cost of our scheme to credit-worthy borrowers (and even to those
who are both credit worthy and confident of never being caught in a rollover crunch). Creditworthy
borrowers who are perceived as certain never to exercise the rollover option would not be hurt
by the obligation to buy it.  An option that will never be exercised  has a price of zero. Of course,
a borrower’s credit worthiness may be his private information, but as we mentioned before, if a
country has sensible debtor-creditor laws and an efficient judicial system, collateral may be used
to overcome the associated adverse-selection problem.  If some countries’ legal systems are
inefficient, we consider the costs due to adverse selection to be a price worth paying if the
alternative is the unnecessary liquidity crunches that periodically damage the world economy.
The introduction of UDROPs is likely to discourage some intermediation and we believe
this is a good thing.  If there is considerable nervousness about the possibility of an international
credit crunch, rollover options would be expensive.  This would discourage inappropriate
intermediation that might have occurred if market participants had not been forced to take a hard
look at the risks.
III.5  How can we put the U in UDROP?
If it is indeed desirable that the rollover option be universal, how could it be made legally so? The
legal issue could be resolved at the national level if governments were to declare any foreign-
currency debt contracts without a rollover option to be illegal, and non-enforceable.  To encourage
countries to impose such a legal clause, the IMF could refuse assistance to countries not requiring
UDROP.  Even better would be an agreement among all IMF members that foreign currency-debt
contracts without the option would be unenforceable in any member’s courts.
III.6  Could the rollover option be strippable?
                                                
19 See Litan [1998].
9While under our proposal every foreign-currency loan would come with a rollover option, it might
be efficient to allow the option to be stripped from the associated debt and to be traded separately.
 While borrowers would not be permitted to sell the right to roll over their debt, the obligation to
provide the funds to finance the rollover could be traded by the creditor (either the original
creditor or the party to whom the debt instrument has subsequently been sold). 
We believe it to be essential that the creditor at the moment the option is exercised, is also
the party that has the obligation to roll over the debt.  This would ensure that, as far as a debtor
caught in a rollover crisis is concerned, the funds to finance the rollover would indeed be there:
the maturity of the existing debt would simply be extended.  The creditors could, however, avail
themselves of private rollover re-insurance.  There is no compelling reason for insisting that
lending and insurance be provided by the same financial intermediary, as long as it is clear that,
should the counterparty in the re-insurance market fail, the obligation to roll over the debt stays
with (or reverts to) the party who is the creditor at the moment the option is exercised.  UDROP
might be ineffective if borrowers had to chase down the purchaser of the option to receive an
extension.
Unbundling the loan and the rollover option has two interesting potential consequences.
The first is that the borrower, while dutifully holding the rollover option on his debt (that is,
holding a long position in rollovers bundled with his debt), could, if rollover options were created
and traded separately, go short in the unbundled rollover option (buy the option back in the market
or write an option himself), thus ending up with a zero or even a negative net rollover position.
 However, the UDROP proposal is designed to make it impossible for foreign currency borrowers
to get rid of their right to roll over their foreign currency liabilities through any dynamic hedging
strategy.  Two features of the UDROP proposal ensure that a borrower cannot be forced into
default either on his original loan or on any contingent liabilities acquired as part of a dynamic
hedging strategy.
The first is that the rollover option is specific (an obligation by the creditor to roll over,
at a specific date, a given amount of foreign currency debt issued by a specific, named borrower)
and has seniority or priority over other obligations incurred by the borrower.  This ensures that
the borrower cannot be forced into default on his original loan. 
The second reason is that if the borrower were to buy back in the market, the obligation
to roll over the loan, he would incur an additional (contingent) foreign currency liability.   The
UDROP proposal applies to all foreign currency obligations, including contingent foreign currency
obligations such as the rollover option.  The borrower would therefore have to obtain a ‘second
tier’ UDROP for the ‘first tier’ UDROP he just acquired.  Clearly, if the amount of ‘second tier’
rollover insurance the borrower had to purchase were limited to the value of the ‘first tier’ option,
he would still not be able to meet his obligation if the original, ‘first tier’ UDROP he bought back
in the market, were to be exercised.  The borrower would default on the ‘first tier’ option rather
than on the original loan.  Our proposal is therefore that the amount of rollover insurance required
for a contingent claim would be the total exposure in the event the contingent claim is exercised.
 This would prevent default on the ‘first tier’ option bought back by the borrower, as well as on
the original loan.   Under our proposal therefore, the borrower who buys back the UDROP from
the lender (or from the market) is required to purchase another option to roll over a foreign
currency liability of the same magnitude as his initial loan.  That ‘second tier’ option could be
exercised only if the ‘first tier’ option were exercised.  The borrower would therefore be in the
same position as he would have been had he not bought back the ‘first tier’ option.  If there are any
transaction costs, no borrower will buy back the ‘first tier’ option.
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These two features of our proposal therefore address the concern that  borrowers would
be tempted to buy back the option themselves and that we would then be back in the same boat as
we started, without UDROPs.20
Consider the following example.  Ruritania obtains a foreign currency loan from Megabank
Inc, with a rollover option attached to the loan.  The option gets stripped and Ruritania buys it back
in the market.  Note that, according to our scheme,  it is “contractually clear, that it is the holder
of the foreign currency credit at the time the option is exercised, who is obliged to roll over the
debt.  It would be the responsibility of that creditor to try and re-claim the rollover from the
party that has written the rollover option, or to whom the rollover obligation has subsequently
been traded”.  Assume there is a rollover crisis.  Ruritania has the right to insist that Megabank
Inc rolls over its debt.  Megabank Inc, having agreed to the rollover, then can go back to Ruritania
to try and compel performance by Ruritania on the option.   Ruritania obviously cannot perform
and would default on the option, had it not been required to acquire a ‘second-tier’ UDROP for
the full value of the foreign currency obligation it would have to meet if the ‘first tier’ UDROP
were to be exercised.   Ruritania now exercises its ‘second tier’ rollover option.  The rollover of
the original loan has taken place, as has the rollover of the original UDROP. 
We are in favour of voluntary rollover insurance, in addition to the mandated rollover
insurance embodied in UDROP.  The adverse selection argument for mandating rollover insurance
(based on the belief that not demanding the rollover option would be used as a signal of superior
creditworthiness) does not apply to trading in unbundled or general rollover options as long as,
as far as the foreign currency debtor is concerned, the original debt obligation remains bundled
with a rollover option for the full face value of the debt at maturity.  The original bundled option
ensures that the creditor cannot compel the debtor to repay a specific loan at maturity.   That
feature survives intact regardless of the amount of additional, general, rollover insurance that is
written.
The second consequence, already referred to, is that, if the option is unbundled and sold
separately, additional counterparty risk could interfere with the ability of the borrower to exercise
the option, if the party to whom the rollover obligation has been sold were to default.21  The
solution to this second potential problem is, again, to make it contractually clear, that it is the
holder of the foreign currency credit at the time the option is exercised, who is obliged to roll over
the debt.  It would be the responsibility of that creditor to try and re-claim the rollover from the
party that has written the rollover option, or to whom the rollover obligation has subsequently been
traded. 
We agree that the rollover option should be an integral part of the loan and that the creditor
at the moment the option is exercised must be obliged to provide the extension if the option is
exercised.  It is also key that foreign currency rollover options be themselves subject to a further
UDROP requirement for the full value at risk if the original option is exercised. Subject to that,
the option could be stripped and traded, with market participants effectively creating a reinsurance
market to spread the risk of UDROPs being exercised.22
                                                
20 Barry Eichengreen, who articulated this concern to us, noted that this argument is directly analogous to the “dynamic hedging
critique” of the idea that emerging markets can insure themselves against crises by prenegotiating commercial credit lines. 
Dynamic hedging refers to an investment strategy where hedges are adjusted over time. For instance, currency risk can be
hedged by taking a short position in the currency of the security.  If this short position changes over time, the hedging strategy
is dynamic. 
21 We are grateful to Wim Boonstra and Han de Jong for this point.
22 We would expect this reinsurance to be provided by financial institutions for whom the currency of the original loan is the home
currency.  For such institutions there is no need for “second tier” UDROPs.
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III.7  Introducing UDROP
It will probably be necessary to ‘grandfather’ existing foreign-currency loans that do not have a
rollover option attached.  UDROPs would then be required only for new foreign currency
borrowing.  As long as the stock of outstanding foreign-currency debt without a rollover option
is significant, some liquidity crisis risk will remain.  As time passes and outstanding foreign-
currency loans without UDROP mature, this risk will dwindle.
IV. Conclusion
UDROP is meant to address the situation where a large number of people all try to leave a room
simultaneously through a small door, hotly pursuing of a limited number of prizes that will be
handed out on a first-come, first-served basis.  If it works as we expect it to, it will not only allow
the system to cope better with a rollover crisis when one occurs, it will also reduce the likelihood
and incidence of such crises.
The UDROP proposal is market friendly and does not involve large administrative,
regulatory and enforcement costs.  There is no need for an independent agency to monitor any
‘trigger’ that would allow the borrower to exercise the option.  The option can be exercised by
the borrower when his original loan expires, under any conditions.  The penalty ensures that under
normal market conditions, no borrower would choose to exercise the option.  It does not require
any commitment of public (bilateral or multilateral) money.
An added benefit of the options is that it would force the market participants, who have to
price these options, to pay serious attention to the prospects of liquidity crises.  The mandatory
rollover option would force all market participants to assess and price these risks.  The pricing,
under orderly market conditions, of instruments for dealing with disorderly market conditions will
no doubt always be an imperfect science.  The cost of not having this international liquidity
insurance in place is however, too high to tolerate.
In the past few centuries, financial markets have fluctuated unpredictably between periods
of orderly market conditions and episodes where herd instinct and collective panic ruled the roost,
liquidity dried up, collateral vanished and asset values collapsed.  The harm inflicted on the real
economy by such liquidity crises has been out of proportion to the cost of forcing all international
financial market players to add UDROPs to foreign currency lending and borrowing.
Professors Merton and Scholes, who may have time on their hands, can derive formulae
for pricing these options, bundled or unbundled.  Options traders can deal in them.  More
important, it would make a contribution to global financial stability.  The alternatives are
continued financial instability, capital controls, foreign exchange controls, taxes on international
capital flows and other costly and inefficient interventions, that invite evasion and corruption. It
seems worth a try.
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